



INNOVATIONS FOR SUCCESSFUL SOCIETIES

PLANNING TRANSFORMATION IN A DIVIDED NATION: CREATING KENYA VISION 2030, 2005–2009

SYNOPSIS

In 2005, forward-thinking planners from government and the private sector began to develop an ambitious strategy to transform Kenya into a middle-income nation with a high quality of life by 2030. Although the East African country's economy had begun to recover from decades of stagnation under authoritarian rule, deep inequalities festered and governance challenges abounded. The coalition government elected in 2002 had promised growth, improved social services, and public sector reforms, but those changes would take longer than a single five-year term. Through public consultations, guidance from experts, and input from the private sector, the Ministry of Planning and the National Economic and Social Council identified priorities, selected high-impact projects, and built support across political, ethnic, and regional divides. Near the end of the strategy development process, the disputed 2007 presidential election triggered a national crisis. However, political rivals agreed to share power and adopted the strategy, called Kenya Vision 2030, as a joint agenda. In 2015, after seven years of implementation, more than a hundred projects were under way, and the document stood firm as the road map for Kenya's future development.

Maya Gainer drafted this case study based on interviews conducted in Nairobi, Kenya, in April 2015. Case published July 2015.

INTRODUCTION

On June 10, 2008, President Mwai Kibaki and Prime Minister Raila Odinga came together to make a landmark policy announcement. On a stage at the Kenyatta International Conference Center, the two leaders launched the most-far-reaching national development plan since Kenya's independence from the British more than 40 years earlier: Kenya Vision 2030.

The festive occasion contrasted starkly with the bitter rivalry that had culminated in the disputed 2007 presidential election, which sparked political and ethnic violence that killed an estimated 1,500 Kenyans.

Earlier in the year, Kibaki and Odinga had agreed to shelve their political and policy differences and govern together to end the crisis. Drawing on areas of agreement, their parties finalized a national strategy, Kenya Vision 2030, that set a policy agenda for the new coalition government.

Initiated under the previous government, the strategy sought to transform Kenya into "a globally competitive and prosperous nation with a high quality of life by 2030." It aimed to make Kenya a middle-income country; improve indicators such as health, education, and gender equality; and strengthen democratic institutions.

The strategy's policy priorities in the economic, social, and political spheres ranged from agriculture to education and the rule of law. Within each priority area, the vision also specified several flagship projects, such as reducing fertilizer costs or hiring more and better-trained teachers.

Kenya's history would make the vision difficult to achieve. Although the economy had performed well in the first years after independence from the British in 1963, growth had stagnated since the 1980s.¹

"The issues in 1963 were the same as the issues in 2003," said economist Waweru Kamau of the Ministry of Planning and National Development. "In terms of poverty, literacy—four decades go down the line, and the needs are essentially the same." Kenya had a de facto one-party government from independence through the 24-year rule of President Daniel arap Moi, who succeeded the country's first president, Jomo Kenyatta, in 1978. Under Moi's authoritarian regime, Kenyans had grown poorer. By 2000, per-capita income in purchasing-power parity terms had fallen to the levels of the late 1970s,² and 56.8% of Kenyans were living in poverty.³

In 1991, Moi had bowed to international pressure and opened politics to opposition parties, but for the next decade, political processes designed to hinder opposition, outright intimidation, and divisions among his adversaries kept him in power.⁴ In 2002, the major opposition parties united to form the National Rainbow Coalition, and they nominated economist and former vice president Kibaki as their presidential candidate. The National Rainbow Coalition won the December 2002 elections with 62% of the vote, and for the first time since independence, Kenya's opposition took office.⁵

The public greeted the new government with an outpouring of enthusiasm, and Gallup's 2002 year-end survey indicated that Kenya's citizens were the most optimistic in the world.⁶ Although past development efforts had fallen short, both

citizens and politicians felt that "this time we are going to do it," said University of Nairobi professor Michael Chege, then a United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) technical adviser to the planning ministry.

The first priority was to reverse the nation's economic decline and lay the foundation for rapid economic growth. "We saw the [first] five years as a recovery period," said Peter Anyang' Nyong'o, then minister of planning and national development. A political science professor and longtime opposition leader, Nyong'o had helped form the National Rainbow Coalition and develop the coalition's policy agenda.

A team of advisers and academics working with Nyong'o in the planning ministry developed a five-year plan called the Economic Recovery Strategy for Employment and Wealth Creation. Nyong'o said the plan was designed to "get the quick wins" through high-impact investments in areas like health, education, and agriculture. From 2002 to 2005, Kenya's gross domestic product (GDP) growth rate rose from 0.5% to 5.9%.⁷ By 2006, the percentage of people living in poverty had fallen to 46% from 56.8% in 2000.⁸

However, Nyong'o and other officials recognized that the wholesale transformation the coalition had promised would take much longer than five years, and the Economic Recovery Strategy would end in 2007. He recalled that a crucial question arose at meetings of the National Economic and Social Council (NESCC), a public-private advisory body: "After recovery, then what?" It was time to plan for the long term.

THE CHALLENGE

To replace the Economic Recovery Strategy, Nyong'o and his team wanted to set long-term development priorities. However, the creation of a national vision brought numerous challenges. To transcend changes in government, the strategy had to build broad-based support from across a divided society. The strategy also had to balance

long-term policy considerations and shorter-term priorities that would lead to fast, concrete action. Finally, the team had to ensure effective follow-through, given past governments' histories of corruption and weak implementation.

Securing support across political, ethnic, and class divides meant the strategy had to confront Kenya's deep inequalities. The team had to find ways to make its plans more inclusive than past policies had been. Samuel Mwale, who was an economist at the NESC and in the office of the presidency, said development programs had been concentrated in a few tightly defined geographic areas since independence, which "implicitly split the country into 'useful Kenya' and 'useless Kenya.'"

The strategy team also had to be careful to avoid perceptions of favoritism. "If we are going to develop a vision for this country, we shouldn't have any groups of Kenyans arguing that they are marginalized," said then economic planning secretary Stephen Wainaina. "We should have projects that spread across the country." However, too much emphasis on ethnic and regional distribution could result in an unfocused strategy or inefficient investments.

Ensuring follow-through on the strategy's promises presented another challenge. In the past, as government personnel had changed, "you'd find a project being abandoned completely," said Wahome Gakuru, who led the core strategy team beginning in 2006. The team viewed broad public and political support as critical to the strategy's sustainability regardless of who was in power. For the strategy to last, "you've got to have Kenyans buy into this," Chege stressed.

"This country has a lot [of knowledge] in terms of what needs to be done, but the question is how you package it so it gets done," Kamau said. A strategy that looked good on paper might have little impact if it had no mechanisms to coordinate projects, monitor progress, and hold the civil service accountable for results.

Furthermore, Kenya had a long history of corruption. If graft diverted revenues and prevented services from reaching citizens, ambitious plans would fall short.

A transformative development plan also required substantial resources, and Kenya was not a wealthy country. Although Kenya's total revenue collection had increased from 201.7 billion shillings (about US\$2.7 billion) in the 2002–03 fiscal year to Ksh297.7 billion (about US\$4 billion) in 2005–06, it was unlikely that the government could afford numerous large-scale investments in addition to its regular obligations.⁹ The strategy had to attract private investors and donors and find ways to coordinate funds from outside government.

Two unforeseen events deepened the challenges associated with building broad consensus. First, the strategy development process launched amid revelations about corrupt procurement deals worth a total of Ksh56 billion (about US\$750 million), collectively known as Anglo Leasing.¹⁰ The 2005 scandal shook the government, undermined citizens' expectations of positive change, and emphasized the management challenges for any future projects.

Second, in November of the same year, a referendum on a proposed new constitution sharpened Kenya's political divisions. Parties that made up the National Rainbow Coalition disagreed on planned constitutional reforms— notably, presidential powers and the devolution of central authority. One party, led by Odinga, who was minister of roads, public works, and housing at the time, felt that the draft constitution concentrated too much power in the presidency.¹¹ The differences of opinion split the coalition, with 7 of 28 cabinet ministers—including Odinga and Nyong'o—campaigning against the draft when the government called a national referendum. The broken coalition and the divisive campaign shattered the country's high hopes for unity after the 2002 election.

Voters rejected the proposed constitution by 58% to 42%.¹² After the referendum, Kibaki sacked his cabinet and reconstituted it without any of the ministers who had campaigned against the draft.¹³ Odinga, Nyong'o, and their supporters joined a new opposition party called the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM), which took its name from the fruit that had symbolized a no vote on the draft constitution.

The tense environment meant that achieving a consensus on Kenya's direction would be more difficult than ever.

FRAMING A RESPONSE

In early 2005, at the midpoint of the Economic Recovery Strategy, leaders in both the public and private sectors considered what to do next. The National Economic and Social Council and the planning ministry reviewed the recovery strategy's achievements and assessed what remained to be done. Permanent Secretary for Planning Edward Sambili, who joined the ministry in 2005 after a term as deputy governor of the central bank, said that many issues central to the strategy, such as infrastructure and unemployment, "did not favor a quick solution."

Established in 2004 as part of the Economic Recovery Strategy, the NESC was chaired by Kenya's president and included key cabinet ministers, business leaders, and several international experts. The council's private and international representation provided a balance that ensured the group's recommendations focused on policy rather than politics, and the varied backgrounds of the members encouraged a variety of ideas.

Learning from East Asia

As the NESC considered next steps, the East Asian tigers, such as Malaysia and Singapore, offered inspiration. Nyong'o stressed, however, the need to examine those countries' transformations and decide which steps might fit

the Kenyan context. "The idea was not to begin by cutting and pasting," he said.

To learn more, a group of council members and NESC staff visited Malaysia in July 2005. The delegation came away impressed by how a country that they considered similar to Kenya—from its ethnic diversity to its British-influenced institutions—had changed within a generation. Although the group drew ideas from some of Malaysia's policies, such as its focus on infrastructure, the main takeaway was the importance of the country's national vision. At the beginning of the visit, Mwale said, "We had not made up our minds about doing a vision . . . [But] on Friday night, after our last briefing, we thought this thing could work."

Other countries in East Asia had followed a similar model. According to Sambili, "One of the things that was very clear was that these countries that [had] made remarkable progress seemed to have stuck to a long-term strategy that was guiding the short-term interventions." Given Kenya's tumultuous politics, the possibility of rallying the country behind shared goals and ensuring policy continuity appealed to the council.

After a presentation by the delegation about Malaysia's experience, the full NESC agreed that a long-term strategy for Kenya would be valuable, although more challenging in a multiparty democracy where political turnover was likely. The Ministry of Planning—at the time still headed by Nyong'o—began work on a concept paper that would set the structure and overall goals for Kenya's national vision.

Creating a framework

"We began to think about what we would like to see really change in this country," Sambili said. "We wanted to see a country that is a good place to live, a country that you love." Practically, that meant policies to increase both the nation's economic growth and citizens' quality of life.

Inspired by a vision of competitiveness and

prosperity, a team of economists from the Ministry of Planning and the Kenya Institute for Public Policy Research and Analysis, a government research group, began considering ways to structure policies so as to realize the vision. The team decided that Kenya's history required that economic, social, and political issues be addressed simultaneously. "When you're thinking of Kenya in the next 30 years, you have to think of all these interdependent pillars that hold the thing together," Nyong'o said.

Chege added that it was impossible to separate economic aspirations from other issues. "We've done that before, and it doesn't work; it gets us nowhere," he said. Services like health care and education determined the quality of the workforce, and governance underpinned economic and social programs. With those relationships in mind, the team decided on a structure of three pillars: economic, social, and political.

After the strategy team defined the structure, the members began to think about goals for each pillar. An ambitious vision could galvanize the civil service and inspire the public to demand major results, but it was important to be realistic. The selection of the overall economic growth target was a source of debate among team members and with politicians.

Wainaina recalled that at the time, "we had momentum in terms of [GDP] growth: we were heading to 7%, so we thought we would be more ambitious and set an even higher target, of 10%." However, Chege said, the 10% target "came from the politicians," and he considered it overambitious. But because of the figure's political appeal, he added, the technical team "had to let it go."

Sambili recalled that even though he believed 10% annual growth was unrealistic, he accepted it because "[we wanted] something worth killing ourselves for . . . so we can work very hard to reach 10%." The goals for the social and political pillars were similarly aspirational. The social pillar

called for "equitable social development in a clean and secure environment," and the political pillar sought to establish an "issue-based, people-centered, result-oriented and accountable" democratic system.

During work on the concept paper, the November 2005 constitutional referendum disrupted the strategy development process. Nyong'o was among the ministers who were forced out and joined the opposition Orange Democratic Movement. However, most of the technical team remained in place, and Nyong'o said, "By the time I was leaving, the foundations to develop Vision 2030 had been laid." With the framework in place and support from the NESC, the process largely continued on the trajectory Nyong'o and his team had envisioned.

Structuring the process

The NESC approved the concept note at a meeting in the lakeside town of Naivasha in January 2006. The council and Ministry of Planning team then recruited a group of experts to turn the vision into a concrete strategy.

The technical team from the Ministry of Planning and the Kenya Institute for Public Policy Research and Analysis continued doing the bulk of the analysis and drafting proposals, joined by staff economists from the NESC. Gakuru joined the NESC in February 2006 and coordinated the team of government planners. He had worked on the national HIV strategy after completing a doctorate in public policy in the United States.

Wainaina said it was important that the strategy be developed by "not just planners from the Ministry of Planning, but also stakeholders." The planning ministry enlisted university faculty members, staff from other ministries, and businesspeople to participate. Chege chaired the broader strategy development committee, which worked with the government team to perform analysis, propose ideas, and respond to feedback.

Before serving as a technical adviser to the ministry, Chege had been with the Ford Foundation and had served as director of the University of Florida's Center for African Studies.

Another group, made up of key permanent secretaries and representatives of the private sector, offered feedback on proposals and decided when they were ready for top-level review. Francis Muthaura, head of the public service and one of Kibaki's closest advisers, was chair of that operations committee.

Finally, the national steering committee, made up of NESC members, reviewed proposals and gave final approval. The government members ensured that the document reflected political constraints, and the representatives from outside government helped prevent the vision from becoming simply the government's political platform.

At every level, Gakuru said, "There was a basic requirement that it be made up of a half share from government and the other half from outside government"—to ensure that "government was not talking to itself."

GETTING DOWN TO WORK

In early 2006, with the overall vision and review structure in place, the technical team began to analyze Kenya's challenges and opportunities and propose ideas. The team's tasks were to identify priorities based on the members' analysis and on consultations with citizens and experts, to develop targets and action plans, to build public and political support for the strategy, and to design tools for managing the strategy's implementation.

Analyzing sectors

Throughout 2006, the planning process moved from the vision's overall structure to the selection of broad focus areas and then to specific projects. The first step was to choose priority sectors in each pillar. In setting economic

priorities, "the idea was that if you identify the key sectors that can pull up the economy, the others would follow," said Leonard Kimani, then acting CEO and economic director at the NESC. To make those decisions, the team had to collect information about the performance, challenges, and potential of each part of Kenya's economy.

At the urging of some private-sector members of the NESC, the government contracted strategy consulting firm McKinsey & Company to assist with the analysis, although not everyone involved said they thought hiring outside consultants was useful or necessary. The consultants, government economists and subject matter experts examined the sectors that had historically contributed the most to Kenya's GDP, such as agriculture and tourism, to determine their potential for growth.

Based on data from the National Bureau of Statistics and academic sources, interviews and focus groups with people working in each sector, and reviews of government expenditures, the group assessed sectoral constraints and how they could be overcome. They also looked at previous development plans, Wainaina said, "and from that, you come up with what appears to have worked, what has not worked, and what the challenges were."

Mwale said key criteria for choosing sectors included potential for job creation, opportunities for value addition, and ability to "put Kenya on the global economic map" by filling niches in demand. Kimani added that ease of investment and anticipated return on investment were critical, given the government's limited resources.

Most of the economic pillar's six sectors had long been drivers of Kenya's economy, but the group also looked for new opportunities based on global trends. Stanley Murage, Kibaki's strategy and policy adviser, said business process outsourcing and offshoring, a major industry in several high-growth developing countries, fit the bill. Kenya had a growing population of educated

and tech-savvy young people, which positioned the nation to compete for a share of worldwide demand.

In the social pillar, the analysis was more challenging. Murage pointed out that although data were available to assess needs in certain key social sectors, such as health and education, accurate numbers were scarce in such areas as informal employment and housing. When quantitative measures were spotty, the team relied more on public consultations and discussions with sector experts. Because of the number of pressing social needs and the range of priorities from different contributors, “we were not able to exclude a lot of things,” Gakuru said.


Early in the process of analyzing sectors, the team recognized that several issues came up as constraints across all three pillars. Without addressing those areas, Kamau said, “no matter how well we do, we’re not going to achieve the vision.” For instance, infrastructure was critical for both getting goods to market and getting citizens to health clinics. Similarly, Muthaura said the

quality of the public service underpinned everything from regulation of manufacturers to construction of affordable housing. The team members decided to assign those issues to a foundational category called *Enablers and Macro*.

Drafting the political pillar proved the most difficult part of the process. With tensions high after the 2005 referendum, the strategy team and political leadership weighed how best to handle the nation’s most contentious issues, such as constitutional reform. Reaching agreement on the political pillar’s structure and content was a long process, shaped by the external environment as well as the planners’ goals.

Consulting the public

From the beginning, Gakuru said, “the president had said he did not want us to develop a Nairobi document” that would appeal only to the capital’s elite. Public participation would help ensure the strategy reflected citizens’ priorities. In addition, if people felt that the vision matched their needs, they would be more likely to support



it—and press politicians to do the same.

The drafting process included two rounds of consultations: one beginning in October 2006 and another beginning in July 2007.¹⁴ In the first round, permanent secretaries, NESC members, and members of the technical team visited each of the country's eight provinces and held district-level meetings to collect ideas about what to emphasize. The consultations included focus group discussions—with members of the clergy and civil society organizations and other local leaders—as well as open forums to reach the public. Several issues, such as health, education, livelihoods, and security, came up consistently around the country, Gakuru said, so including those in the strategy “was a no-brainer.” Kamau recalled that civil society groups placed strong emphasis on transparency and accountability.

The second round saw greater emphasis on getting feedback on the proposals and collecting ideas for specific projects. However, Sambili said many of the ideas were “very detailed, and very region specific. . . . You have a sense that this is more detailed and more refined [and] can't go into the big long-term strategy itself.” He recalled that some proposals—such as promoting tourist attractions in western Kenya and improving roads to Samburu National Reserve, a remote park known for its diverse wildlife—were included because of their potential for nationwide impact, whereas other, more-local ideas were incorporated into narrower and shorter-term sector plans.

Setting targets, drafting action plans

With the highest-potential sectors identified, the strategy team began to consider projects that would be necessary for each sector to meet its targets, which had been set on the basis of the analysis of sectors' potential and comparisons to rapidly industrializing countries. The team organized sector committees of ministry staff, academics, businesspeople, and civil society leaders to discuss the biggest gaps in each sector

and make recommendations for large-scale projects or reforms that would lead to further improvements. Wainaina said the goal was for the government to fund a set of high-impact projects that would create space for private investment.

For example, in the housing sector, the target was to build 200,000 units of affordable housing annually to keep pace with Kenya's growing urban population.¹⁵ To increase private construction, the housing committee proposed a radical reform of Kenya's building code, which NESC secretary Julius Muia, who participated in the committee as a private sector expert from the Housing Finance Company of Kenya, said still used colonial standards intended for a cold climate that made construction unnecessarily expensive. (For an example of how sector plans were structured, see figure 3 on page 18.)

The technical team selected proposals to include for each sector, and after sector experts and the operations committee signed off on a draft, it went to the president, the cabinet, and the NESC for review. “The NESC and the cabinet subdivided into policy-level committees and would look at the draft, and a lot of times, they would come up with comments,” Chege said. The strategy team and experts then decided how to respond, and “by the time you've gone through a couple iterations, you begin to develop consensus,” he added.

With so many people and organizations involved, the review process sometimes produced substantial disagreements. For instance, Murage recalled that representatives of the public and private sectors had problems seeing eye to eye on tax rates. Chege said that when technical staff disagreed with political leaders, the staff referred to data and widely accepted examples from East Asia to support their positions.

Still, political considerations clearly shaped the strategy. Kimani said it was a “political imperative” for flagship projects to “have the face of Kenya If you look at a map of the flagship

projects, you'll see they are distributed across the country to ensure ownership of the vision."

The goal was to select projects across the country that would meet the criteria of job creation, value addition, and return on investment, which Wainaina said would "follow naturally" because many areas had untapped potential. But achieving both regional distribution and impact was challenging, and by the end of the process, the vision comprised more than 120 projects. Projects under the economic pillar included upgrading infrastructure and accommodations in infrequently visited national parks and establishing industrial parks for small and medium-size enterprises; social projects ranged from hiring and training community-level health workers to developing municipal waste management systems.¹⁶

The political pillar had less detail than the other components of the strategy. After the divisive 2005 referendum, some politicians were wary of making explicit proposals for restructuring politics, especially with the 2007 election—which promised another fight over constitutional issues—around the corner. Chege said the technical team proposed several specific ideas, such as improving Kenya's standing on the Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index, but the metrics proved too contentious. The higher-level committees rejected those proposals "three times, outright, as undoable" in the political climate of the time, Gakuru said.

Instead, the committees agreed to leave the political pillar comparatively vague. They made a new constitution the pillar's central project but planned that it be drafted anew through a separate process. The vision offered only general principles, such as public participation and gender equality. It also laid out broad categories for governance reforms, such as rule of law and transparency, but instead of specifying projects, it listed general strategies such as strengthening the legal

framework for anti-corruption and ethics.¹⁷

Gakuru said a focus on principles rather than detailed proposals was the best option under the circumstances. The government and opposition strongly disagreed on constitutional issues, and after the 2005 experience, he said, "we did not want to take those ideas, put them in a document that was supposed to be overarching, and then suffer the consequences of messing up everything. It would derail the social agenda and the economic agenda."

Planning for implementation

The next step was to ensure follow-through. Meeting the vision's ambitious targets required action plans, resources, coordination—and an appreciation for the dynamics of politics and elections.

To manage implementation, the team decided to create a separate coordinating unit: the Vision Delivery Secretariat. Many of the projects "cut through different ministries and agencies, so there needed to be a body that has a bird's-eye view," Gakuru said. In addition to interagency coordination, the secretariat was responsible for monitoring progress, promoting investment in the projects, and maintaining public and political support. Secretariat staff worked out many of the details after beginning work in 2009, but the planning process developed several tools to help them manage implementation.

Although Vision 2030 was a 22-year strategy, detailed implementation plans set interim milestones. The strategy team divided implementation into five-year medium-term plans for each administration to develop in detail at the beginning of its term. The five-year cycle enabled politicians to set priorities for their administrations within the vision and fulfilled their desire to deliver tangible results for voters before the next election.

Mugo Kibati, a businessman who became the first director general of the Vision Delivery

Secretariat in 2009, said it was important to break projects into smaller pieces that would show results within five years “so each political administration is able to showcase what it has done and take credit for it.”

In addition to the political value of the medium-term plans, the structure enabled the longer-term strategy to evolve in response to changing situations. “It gives us the opportunity to review. . . . If something in the vision didn’t work out well in the previous five years and you think you can put in something new, the five-year medium-term plans would give room for new ideas to be brought in,” Wainaina said.

Partnerships with the private sector increased the available resources. Business associations such as the Kenya Private Sector Alliance played key roles in engaging private investors in projects considered commercially viable, such as ports; and the government planned to fund public services that could not be made profitable. The 2008–12 medium-term plan had a total budget of Ksh1.6 trillion (about US\$22.8 billion at the time), with Ksh500 billion (US\$7.1 billion) expected to come from the government and Ksh1.1 trillion (US\$15.7 billion) from private investments.¹⁸

Finally, to ensure the civil service followed through on the plans spelled out in the vision and in each medium-term plan, the strategy team chose to continue using performance contracts, a tool first introduced in the 2005–06 fiscal year to implement the Economic Recovery Strategy. Although not linked to financial incentives or disciplinary action, public announcements of the performance ratings helped push government agencies to deliver, Kimani said.

Building support

The success of the strategy hinged on the ability of planners to cultivate citizens’ enthusiasm that would pressure politicians to support the vision, especially after specific proposals began to become public in 2007. “You need the whole

country almost drunk with the idea of the vision,” so citizens would demand that politicians adopt it, Kimani said.

An important first step was relatively easy: telling communities about projects in their area. But given the vision’s focus on major projects and selected sectors, particularly in the economic pillar, it was crucial to explain why the program was important for the entire country, said George Outa, a UNDP-funded technical adviser who had been working with the planning ministry since 2003 and managed the Vision 2030 communications strategy. Technical staff promoted the vision by appearing frequently on television and radio and submitting op-ed pieces for newspapers. The team regularly briefed journalists on progress and arranged two 3-day press workshops to discuss “what national vision means [and] why this document was important for the country,” Gakuru said.

The communications team also developed two versions of printed materials that broadened the appeal of the program and saved money, Outa said. A 136-page English publication provided details of flagship projects and spelled out the analysis that led to their selections. A streamlined 26-page brochure, designed mainly for the general public, summarized the analysis and simply listed the projects. The shorter version was translated into Swahili, Kenya’s most widely spoken language.

However, face-to-face interaction was the most effective method, Outa said. Teams of permanent secretaries, NESC members, and technical staff visited remote areas of the country to hold town hall meetings. Outa said that even though “it was not always 100% consensus” at the meetings, “I think people liked the idea that you were even selling the idea to them and giving them a chance to argue with you.”

Building support for the vision posed a challenge in the midst of a heated election. Gakuru said planners worked hard to convince

citizens that the strategy was not part of one party's campaign. The consistent message was "that it is not a government document; it is not a Kibaki document. It is a national document," he said.

Sending "teams not led by politicians but teams led by technical people" to hold forums helped somewhat to distance the strategy from the campaign, Wainaina said. Outa added that participation by respected members of the private sector and civil society lent the vision credibility.

To ensure the strategy remained in place regardless of the outcome of the election, "it was critical to bring the political parties into the process," Muthaura said. The team reached out to politicians to solicit ideas and support. "We were having breakfast meetings with parliament, both government and opposition," Chege said.

Despite sharp differences on constitutional issues, the two main parties offered relatively similar development policies, which prevented the vision from becoming a major flash point. Furthermore, because the process had started under the National Rainbow Coalition, the strategy reflected some degree of consensus. Nyong'o, who had become secretary-general of the opposition Orange Democratic Movement in 2005, said, "The campaign of 2007 was so much based on the referendum in 2005, it was a continuation really." The economic and social policies detailed in the vision took a backseat during the campaign—and the electoral crisis that followed.

OVERCOMING OBSTACLES

By the end of 2007, Vision 2030 was close to completion, but the presidential election late that year threatened to derail the final stages of the process. On December 27, Kenyans went to the polls to settle the political differences that had split the country since the 2005 referendum. When the results for parliament came in, the ODM had won 99 seats compared with 43 for

Kibaki's Party of National Unity, although other parties affiliated with Kibaki had won enough seats to make the count for the two sides roughly even.¹⁹

The presidential contest was close, but several early polls showed the ODM's presidential candidate, Odinga, leading Kibaki. However, the electoral commission declared Kibaki the winner of the presidential ballot by 46% to 44%.²⁰

Odinga and his supporters accused Kibaki and his party of fraud, and both national and international observers said the tallies had been manipulated.²¹ Some protests by ODM supporters became violent, and others resulted in clashes with police. The unrest quickly intensified along ethnic lines, and supporters of each candidate targeted members of the groups associated with their rival.²² The strife continued for several weeks, killing an estimated 1,500 Kenyans and internally displacing up to 600,000.²³

A group of African leaders led by former United Nations secretary-general Kofi Annan secured a power-sharing agreement between the two candidates in February 2008. Kibaki retained the presidency and appointed Odinga to the newly created post of prime minister. Their parties split the cabinet positions.²⁴

Following more than a month of negotiation over cabinet appointments, the new government, known as the grand coalition, took office in mid-April. The agreement brought an end to the violence and promised sweeping electoral and constitutional reforms. However, the new structure complicated the implementation of Vision 2030. The two sides had to agree on shared policies and work together to carry them out.

Reaching a shared agenda

After the coalition stabilized, each party appointed a small team of experts to develop a shared governing agenda. The parties largely agreed at a technical level and generally supported

the policies and projects contained in Vision 2030. The strategy helped the team select specific proposals from each party's platform for the coalition government to carry out over its five-year term, said Silvester Kasuku, who served as an adviser to Odinga. However, the parties disagreed on two key policy points. The first related to constitutional issues, particularly devolution of authority, and the other involved the extent of redistributive spending to address income inequality.

The technical teams proposed minor changes to resolve the differences. To accommodate the ODM's focus on inequality, Gakuru said, the technical teams added a short section to the social pillar on poverty reduction and equity and added references to equity in other parts of the text. Although most constitutional issues would be addressed through a separate drafting process, Chege said that a reference to devolution was also added to the vision's political pillar during the revisions.

According to Kasuku, it was easier to accept the vision because "some members of the ODM were part of the government during the [initial] process of making these policies." Most notably, he said, ODM secretary-general Nyong'o had been minister of planning. Technical experts affiliated with each party had also contributed to the drafting process. As a result, "it was not a surprise to anyone," Chege said.

Furthermore, given the postelection crisis and the international pressure to reach an agreement, the parties had no choice but to work together. "The election created a very good reason for them to relent," Outa said.

Building the Vision Delivery Secretariat

In June 2008, just two months after the formal creation of the coalition government, Kibaki and Odinga officially launched Vision 2030 at an event at the Kenyatta International Conference Center. Regardless of the political

circumstances, members of the strategy team anticipated that delivering on a strategy would be more difficult than developing a document. "We all knew the challenge would come in the implementation stage," Wainaina said. Coalition politics added a layer of complexity.

Responsibility for managing implementation lay with the Vision Delivery Secretariat, which had been created as a semiautonomous agency within the renamed Ministry of Planning, National Development, and Vision 2030.

The delivery secretariat's position within the government "was a political compromise of the coalition government," Kibati said. Both he and Gakuru said the secretariat should have been in the office of the president or prime minister—like delivery units in many governments around the world—but coalition politics made that option infeasible. Because many staff in the planning ministry were career civil servants, the ministry appeared to be a more neutral location. In addition, the minister, Wycliffe Oparanya, was a member of the ODM, which would ensure the party's priorities were accounted for in implementation.

Kibati, a graduate of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology who had previously served as CEO of a regional cable manufacturing company, became director general of the Vision Delivery Secretariat in July 2009. He recalled that Muthaura had contacted him about the position through Sambili after several failed attempts to recruit a candidate supported by both parties. Upon accepting the job, Kibati had to build an agency that could coordinate across departments, ensure projects were on track, and sustain broad support for the vision. The task was difficult under any circumstances but especially under a coalition in which internal disagreements sometimes hindered management and policy implementation.

First, Kibati had to carve out the secretariat's role. "When you have a new unit in government,

there are turf wars,” he said. “I therefore had to secure the unequivocal support of the presidency, the prime minister, [and] the head of public service in ensuring that any request I made would be seen to have the backing of those three offices.” Kibati worked to build relationships with all three and gained the leverage the secretariat needed to win the cooperation of the civil service and political appointees in each party.

In coordinating projects, secretariat staff had to navigate the internal politics of the coalition. Outa pointed out that the details of oversight roles had not been laid out clearly in the power-sharing agreement. The prime minister had the official power to “coordinate and supervise the execution of the functions of the Government of Kenya including those of ministries.”²⁵ However, the agreement did not specify the relationship between the supervisory functions of the prime minister and those of other officials—especially the head of the public service—which Muthaura acknowledged led to “a bit of conflict” early in the coalition period.²⁶

As the coalition partners worked out their respective responsibilities, the Vision Delivery Secretariat had to remain neutral and communicate effectively with both sides. Kibati recalled he regularly sent 20 copies of important letters “because I made sure that everybody in the coalition who needed to know about a particular policy was copied on the same letter at the same time.”

ASSESSING RESULTS

Among policy experts, key criteria in the evaluation of a strategy include inclusive planning, rigorous prioritization, adaptability, widespread awareness, and mechanisms to monitor implementation.²⁷ Vision 2030 performed well on several of those criteria but had some significant weaknesses.

Inclusion was built into each stage of the process—from participation by private sector

representatives and academics on the strategy development committees to the public consultations. Many of those involved considered Vision 2030 a significant step toward government openness and transparency.

However, Abdullahi Halakhe, a researcher at Amnesty International and the United Nations who was in a position to scrutinize the development process, said the consultations were not deep or broad enough and appeared to be largely pro forma—“for the purpose of ticking the box.” Members of the strategy team said it was difficult to incorporate citizens’ ideas into a national-level strategy. Even so, Halakhe pointed out that more-effective consultation could ease communities’ acceptance of large projects and warn policy makers of potential negative effects on the environment, land rights, and labor.

The strategy team emphasized awareness through both the consultation process and communications. However, “no amount of communication can reach everybody,” Outa acknowledged. Especially in the most remote parts of the country, where there was little media access and populations were too dispersed to easily attend informational events, both participation and awareness were limited.

“There were some people who had only heard of it and didn’t know what it was. But suffice it to say everyone had heard of Vision 2030, and everybody at least knew this is about changing Kenya into a better place,” Kibati said.

Broad-based public support and the emphasis on inclusion helped maintain political support for the vision and turned it into a test of politicians’ commitment to Kenya’s development. In the 2013 election, both major coalitions promised to continue working toward Vision 2030.²⁸ Newly elected president Uhuru Kenyatta stated his commitment to the vision,²⁹ whereas opposition leader Odinga accused Kenyatta of undermining progress toward it.³⁰

“Everybody campaigns on Vision 2030, and

the political debate now is about different ways to implement it,” Mwale said.

In another demonstration of political support, in 2012 parliament voted to make the vision Kenya’s official development policy.

The planners’ determination to provide something for everyone resulted in a broad national plan rather than a more targeted strategy. With 28 priority sectors and more than 120 flagship projects in the original vision, the strategy showed a “marked lack of prioritization,” according to an assessment by the International Development Association (IDA), a World Bank agency that assists the world’s poorest countries, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).³¹ In addition, a US State Department cable released by WikiLeaks criticized the breadth of the strategy, stating that it “captures pretty much the entire reform agenda . . . [and] thus appears highly unrealistic.”³² (However, public statements by US officials were more supportive.³³)


Even within the strategy team, some said Vision 2030 had become too broad. “The social pillar looks unwieldy,” Mwale said, because of the difficulty planners had in trying to achieve consensus on priority sectors. In practice,

Muthaura said, enablers such as infrastructure and the public service, as well as the constitution, received the greatest emphasis in the first years of implementation, but the document did not explicitly sequence priorities.

Observers also questioned whether the strategy’s targets were realistic, especially the goal of 10% annual GDP growth. Although the IMF and IDA assessment praised the vision’s overall direction, the study found that its growth and investment targets were unrealistic.³⁴ The Economist Intelligence Unit called the targets “wildly optimistic.”³⁵ Some members of the technical team, such as Chege, also characterized the 10% target as overambitious. From 2012 to 2014, annual GDP growth held steady at about 5%.³⁶

The Kenyan public was divided on the issue. In a poll conducted by Transparency International in August 2013, 45% of respondents said government priorities were both good and realistic, and 37% said they were good but unrealistic.³⁷

The vision did allow for some adaptation to changing circumstances. It was designed to be implemented by way of five-year medium-term



plans and yearly performance contracts, “so, depending on what the country is dealing with, we are able to respond,” Gakuru said. Wainaina said the addition of oil and mineral resources—a sector originally rejected as lacking sufficient potential—in the second medium-term plan after the 2012 discovery of oil demonstrated flexibility.

However, the IMF and IDA criticized the extent to which implementation plans responded to changing circumstances, including the effects of the postelection violence and spillovers from the 2008 global financial crisis.³⁸ Despite a more challenging environment, Halakhe said, “I’ve yet to see that evolution, that flexibility.” Although the medium-term plans were intended to be flexible, the strategy did not specify how to adjust the overall vision or top-line targets.

The pace of progress was uneven across sectors. In June 2015, the Vision 2030 website listed 39% of the projects and subprojects as on or ahead of schedule, 31% as having started, and 30% as not started or behind schedule.³⁹ Gakuru, Mwale, and others involved cited the adoption of a new constitution in 2010 and improvements to roads, ports, and other infrastructure as key areas of progress. However, several social indicators, such as mortality rates and water access, fell short of 2012 targets.⁴⁰

The vision included several oversight mechanisms, but they lacked teeth. The strategy created a dedicated unit, the Vision Delivery Secretariat, to coordinate and monitor projects; and agency-specific performance contracts were intended to keep implementation on track. However, without organizational or budgetary authority over other agencies, the secretariat had to rely on persuasion, political connections, and force of personality to secure those agencies’ cooperation. Chege said the secretariat became less active after the change of government and the end of Kibati’s term as director general in 2013 and that in 2015 “we hardly hear of them.”

Even after a change of administration, Vision

2030 remained Kenya’s national strategy, which many considered an achievement in itself. Nyong’o expected the vision to continue to guide policy even though priorities could shift. Changing directions would be difficult, he said, because “certain things have been thought about, frameworks have been laid. . . . I’m not saying it’s cast in stone, no. But you have to convince me that what you’re introducing is qualitatively different, or more useful, or more productive.”

REFLECTIONS

Ten years after the process of developing Kenya Vision 2030 began, many of those involved were proud that the strategy had spanned many of Kenya’s divides. Mugo Kibati, who served as the first director general of the Vision Delivery Secretariat, said: “This is a very politically and ethnically discordant state, and everything is assumed to have an ulterior motive, an agenda that is either ethnic or political. Vision 2030 actually cleared that bar.”

Around the time that Kenya began developing Vision 2030, other African countries, too, grappled with the challenge of designing national visions that could drive development policy for years to come. A United Nations Development Programme review of several earlier strategy development processes in Africa stressed the need to maintain political support that would ensure a document’s priorities would be translated into action—an area that Kenya strongly emphasized during the creation of Vision 2030.⁴¹

Broad participation in developing the strategy was critical to securing support. Peter Anyang’ Nyong’o, who initiated the strategy development process as minister for planning and national development before joining the opposition in 2005, said that involving outsiders in policy planning was a major step forward. “To me the biggest achievement was having a platform [the National Social and Economic Council] for the private sector and professionals and

government to think together and push through policies and programs with more legitimacy.”

The role of politicians from across the political spectrum in drafting and implementing the strategy also helped ensure its longevity. Despite a tense political environment, members of both the government and the opposition backed the goals they had developed together under the National Rainbow Coalition.

Kibati added that finalizing the strategy under the grand coalition had paved the way for long-term political and public support. “The benefit that I think a lot of people lose sight of—of having Vision 2030 launched during a coalition government—was that it had political buy-in across the board,” he said. “It was a situation in which we did not have an opposition in parliament and no real constituency in the wider public that felt they were outside government.”

Securing the broadest possible backing for the vision required some trade-offs, however. Although some participants said certain aspects of the strategy could have been done better, such as more-rigorous prioritization of projects or more-concrete proposals in the political pillar, they said the need to build a political consensus shaped those outcomes.

It was crucial to win support from the civil service as well as politicians. Nyong’o said: “The civil service tends to be very indifferent to politicians sometimes. . . . You’re a politician, you’re here for only five years; we’ve been here forever.” Kibati said his first objective was “to get the government itself to buy into Vision 2030. You can’t take that for granted.”

Government technical staff’s central role in drafting the strategy ensured ownership within the civil service, former head of public service Francis Muthaura said. The emphasis on local leadership also deepened commitment to the vision within government. In contrast to earlier, donor-driven programs, “this is something we thought would be homegrown,” economic planning secretary

Stephen Wainaina said.

By aiming high, members of the strategy team said, they sought to change Kenya’s approach to development. “You create an ambition for the country,” Muthaura said. “Once you have a vision, people see it is possible to do bigger things.” The strategy adopted a model similar to that of Malaysia, where Idris Jala, CEO of the country’s delivery unit, set highly ambitious targets to motivate “outside-the-box thinking.”

Kibati said the vision shifted attitudes outside government as well. “The expectations that Kenyans have of their leadership changed dramatically,” he said. “When we elected Mwai Kibaki in 2003, all that people wanted him to do was to fill the potholes in the roads. They never had the concept of expanding . . . That didn’t exist before Vision 2030.”

EPILOGUE: WORKING TOWARD 2030

After the June 2008 launch of Kenya Vision 2030, the Vision Delivery Secretariat oversaw its implementation. Line ministries carried out individual projects, but the secretariat coordinated projects that cut across agencies, monitored progress, and managed public communications.

Keeping projects on track required regular monitoring and mechanisms for accountability. Performance contracts, which had been introduced under the Economic Recovery Strategy, were central to the effort. Mugo Kibati, the first director general of the Vision Delivery Secretariat, said that if Vision 2030 projects formed part of their performance ratings, civil servants would see the vision as part of their everyday responsibilities, and “not some pet project on the side.” However, performance contracts encompassed a wide range of administrative and policy functions. Kibati recalled that it had taken a major effort to persuade the separate Performance Contracting Department to accord Vision 2030 projects 30 to 40% of departments’ scores.

Performance contracts could create a backlash if not used with care. To get support from the civil servants who would drive implementation, Kibati said, he would ask each department what it needed from other parts of the government in order to complete its own Vision 2030 projects. Kibati's team would then make sure those requests got included in the various departments' performance contracts. Using the contracts as a way for civil servants to get support from other entities bought the secretariat "a lot of goodwill," Kibati said.

With targets agreed upon, the Vision Delivery Secretariat monitored progress through meetings of its board of directors, where the focal points for each project gave updates. Secretariat staff also collected quarterly reports from ministry liaisons, supplemented by site visits and documents, which they reviewed and passed on to the cabinet. The secretariat and its board of directors were responsible for keeping projects on track.

Acting Director General Wainaina Gituro said problems often arose from a lack of interagency coordination. Meetings of the Vision Delivery Board, which brought together key permanent secretaries and influential businesspeople, "became places where you could come, find all the bosses . . . and you could ask [for your issue] to be resolved," Kibati said. When poor coordination was a factor, the meetings helped the project leaders develop shared action plans and deadlines. If an issue required budget realignment, assignment of a new responsibility to a department, or a complex procurement, the board referred the issue to the cabinet.

Another common problem was that ministries had priorities other than Vision 2030 projects. Gituro said that highlighting a project in front of the board's influential members encouraged officials to take action. He added that performance contracts pressured civil servants to keep working because of the negative media

coverage received by agencies at the bottom of the government's published performance ratings.

In 2015, those involved in Vision 2030 foresaw significant implementation challenges ahead. Wahome Gakuru, director of the government technical team beginning in 2006, said corruption "continues to be a leg of clay; it's actually our weakest point." Despite announcements of crackdowns on corruption and the vision's promise to improve government ethics, the problem remained widespread. From 2005 to 2013, both Kenya's ranking and score on Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index barely moved.⁴² Beginning in 2013, Kenyan newspapers and members of parliament raised questions about corruption in a major Vision 2030 project, which was a Ksh327-billion contract (about US\$3.39 billion at the time) with the government of China to build a standard-gauge railroad from Mombasa to Nairobi.⁴³

National security problems posed another threat. A series of terrorist attacks that began in 2013 caused serious economic damage, especially in the tourism sector. In 2014, tourism earnings fell by 7.3% compared with 2013, and arrivals were down by 11.1%.⁴⁴ "I think we are at a point of no return as far as dealing with terrorism," Gakuru said. Failure to deal effectively with terrorism, he warned, could "create havoc for all the pillars of Vision 2030."

The constitution approved in 2010 also meant that officials at both the national and local levels had to decide how to carry out Vision 2030 programs within a newly devolved system. The new constitution replaced Kenya's eight provinces and 69 districts with 47 counties and gave county governments a broader range of responsibilities than previous local governments had had. Power struggles between the central government and the county governors elected in 2013, as well as the need to build capacity at the county level, posed challenges for future implementation.

Figure 3 The national vision for the housing sector under the social pillar.





Figure 4

Timeline: Kenya Vision 2030



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